lawful intercept/IOS at BlackHat DC, bypassing and recommendations

[smb at cs.columbia.edu (Steven Bellovin)]

On Feb 4, 2010, at 5:42 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:

> On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Crist Clark <Crist.Clark at globalstar.com> wrote:
> 
>>> this seems like much more work that matt blaze's work that said:
>> "Just
>>> send more than 10mbps toward what you want to sneak around... the
>>> LEA's pipe is saturated so nothing of use gets to them"
>> 
>> The Cross/XForce/IBM talk appears more to be about unauthorized
>> access to communications via LI rather than evading them,
>> 
>>  "...there is a risk that [LI tools] could be hijacked by third
>>   parties and used to perform surveillance without authorization."
>> 
>> Of course, this has already happened,
> 
> right... plus the management (for cisco) is via snmp(v3), from
> (mostly) windows servers as the mediation devices (sad)...  and the
> traffic is simply tunneled from device -> mediation -> lea .... not
> necessarily IPSEC'd from mediation -> LEA, and udp-encapped from
> device -> mediation server.
> 
>>  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005
> 
> yea, good times... that's really just re-use of the normal LEA hooks
> in all telco phone switch gear though... not 'calea features' in
> particular.

There's a difference?  CALEA is just the US goverment profile of the generic international concept of lawful intercept.

I recommend http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/jul07/5280 (linked to from the Wikipedia article) as a very good reference on what is and isn't known.

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb