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The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model

Subject: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model
From: chort at smtps.net (Brian Keefer)
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 07:34:20 -0700
In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

On Mar 24, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Harald Koch wrote:

> On 3/23/2011 11:05 PM, Martin Millnert wrote:
>> To my surprise, I did not see a mention in this community of the
>> latest proof of the complete failure of the SSL CA model to actually
>> do what it is supposed to: provide security, rather than a false sense
>> of security.
> 
> This story strikes me as a success - the certs were revoked immediately, and it took a surprisingly short amount of time for security fixes to appear all over the place.
> 
> <snip>
> -- 
> Harald

I'd hardly call the fact that it required manual blacklist patches to every browser a "success".  SSL is a failure if real revocation requires creating a patch for browsers and relying on users to install it.

--
bk

References:
- The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model
  - From: millnert at gmail.com (Martin Millnert)
- The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model
  - From: chk at pobox.com (Harald Koch)

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