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huawei
- Subject: huawei
- From: mysidia at gmail.com (Jimmy Hess)
- Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2013 20:58:42 -0500
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <2116700651-1371140872-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-420291214-@b4.c20.bise6.blackberry> <[email protected]>
On 6/13/13, Patrick W. Gilmore <patrick at ianai.net> wrote:
> It should be trivial to prove to yourself the box is, or is not, doing
> something evil if you actually try.
What if it's not doing anything evil 99% of the time... after all
90%+ of traffic may be of no interest to a potential adversary, but
there is a backdoor mechanism that allows "targetted evilness" to be
enabled?
Sniffing on a targetted IP address can be disguised as "legitimate"
return traffic, to a connection actually initiated from the "backdoor
data interaction point" to some other web server, creating a ruse..
A low-bandwidth fabricated return flow on top of the legitimate
return flow once every few months, or every few days is extremely
likely to go unnoticed, on any network that has a significantly
large amount of normal production traffic.
> --
> TTFN,
> patrick
--
-JH
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