BGP in the Washngton Post

[randy at psg.com (Randy Bush)]

> Yes, RPKI protects from fat fingered people, but NOT protects from
> people doing hijacks knowingly.

the rpki protects from fat fingers as well as the telephone white pages
protects from wrong number dialing.  it doesn't.

for the 312th time (i had to make this clear once again from the floor
of nanog this week), ...

    The RPKI is an X.509 based hierarchy [rfc 6481] which is congruent
    with the internet IP address allocation administration, the IANA,
    RIRS, ISPs, ...  It is just a database, but is the substrate on
    which the next two mechanisms are based.  It is currently deployed
    in all five administrative regions.

    RPKI-based Origin Validation [RFC 6811] uses some of the RPKI data
    to allow a router to verify that the autonomous system originating
    an IP address prefix is in fact authorized to do so.  This is not
    crypto checked so can be violated.  But it should prevent the vast
    majority of accidental 'hijackings' on the internet today, e.g. the
    famous Pakistani accidental announcement of YouTube's address space.
    RPKI-based origin validation is in shipping code from AlcaLu, Cisco,
    Juniper, and possibly others.

    RPKI-based Path Validation, a future technology still being designed
    [draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-06.txt], uses the full crypto
    information of the RPKI to make up for the embarrassing mistake
    that, like much of the internet BGP was designed with no thought to
    securing the BGP protocol itself from being gamed/violated.  It
    allows a receiver of a BGP announcement to cryptographically
    validate that the autonomous systems through which the announcement
    passed were indeed those which the sender/forwarder at each hop
    intended.

randy