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Attacks on BGP Routing Ranges
- Subject: Attacks on BGP Routing Ranges
- From: jlewis at lewis.org (Jon Lewis)
- Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 07:39:19 -0400 (EDT)
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <[email protected]>, <CAAeewD9y+62PqKZ4rNi9ibe0qsg3Do=Npw9WhuEGPtW4ZRDKNw@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]>
On Wed, 18 Apr 2018, Ryan Hamel wrote:
>> c) do run BGP with GTSM, so you can drop BGP packets with lower TTL than 255
>
> Could you explain how this can resolve my issue? I am not sure how this would work.
If the issue is flooding to your interface IP, that's not a relevant
countermeasure. You're pretty much limited to asking the upstream to
filter traffic to your interface IP, or asking them if you can renumber
the interface into non-globally-routed IPs. If they're unwilling to do
either, "you've chosen the wrong transit provider" and should start
shopping for replacements.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Jon Lewis, MCP :) | I route
| therefore you are
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