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This DNS over HTTP thing
- Subject: This DNS over HTTP thing
- From: jan at philippi.pw (Jan Philippi)
- Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 12:01:14 +0200
- In-reply-to: <33451.1570009557@turing-police>
- References: <[email protected]> <33451.1570009557@turing-police>
The thing is: People were conditioned for years to look for the padlock,
because padlock means secure.
How will we ever get this out of their minds..
Jan
SMTP: jan at philippi.pw
XMPP: jan at himbeere.pw
GPG: 45F3 2DF0 4D55 C4B4 2083 14C5 5727 D54F *E4E2 2A3C*
Am 02.10.19 um 11:45 schrieb Valdis KlÄ?tnieks:
> On Wed, 02 Oct 2019 01:55:13 -0600, "Keith Medcalf" said:
>
>> It is a common fallacy that TLS connections are authenticated. The vast
>> majority of them are not authenticated in any meaningful fashion and all that
>> can be said about TLS is that it provides an encrypted connection between the
>> two communicating applications. This is perhaps why it is call *transport*
>> layer security ...
>
> Another major disconnect is that TLS validates the hostname that the browser
> decided to connect to, not the host you thought you were connecting to..
>
> The end result is that if a phish directs you to nan0g.org, it can still show a
> padlock and the user is none the wiser....
>
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