QUIC traffic throttled on AT&T residential

[danwing at gmail.com (Dan Wing)]

There are choices, such as making connection initiation, connection acceptance, and connection termination parsable by network elements on the path so state can be established, maintained, and cleared, DoS can be identified, and so on.  The decision was to hide all that from network elements.

-d


> On Feb 20, 2020, at 7:54 PM, Matthew Kaufman <matthew at matthew.at> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 8:10 AM Ca By <cb.list6 at gmail.com <mailto:cb.list6 at gmail.com>> wrote:
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> 
> Not indiscriminate. 
> 
> As Google was informed by network operators all along since 2014, ipv4 UDP is a major uptime threat via DDoS to access networks.  
> ...
> 
> Google choose not to be sensitive to that, they were told where the landmines were, they choose to go on anyhow. 
> 
> 
> It isnâ??t like they had a choice. You canâ??t build a transport protocol like QUIC on top of TCP (I know, I built one of its ancestors, which also uses UDP underneath). And if you think getting UDP through existing networks is hard, try using a novel IP protocol number.
> 
> Matthew Kaufman
> 

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